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Abstract. - In statistical physics, the conservation of particle number results in the equalization
of the chemical potential throughout a system at equilibrium. In contrast, the homogeneity of
utility in socio-economic models is usually thought to rely on the competition between individuals,
leading to Nash equilibrium. We show that both views can be reconciled by introducing a notion
of chemical potential in a wide class of socio-economic models, and by relating it in a direct way to
the equilibrium value of the utility. This approach also allows the dependence of utility across the
system to be determined when agents take decisions in a probabilistic way. Numerical simulations
of a urban economic model also suggest that our result is valid beyond the initially considered
class of solvable models.
Socio-economic sciences and statistical physics are both
interested in the evolution of systems characterized by a
large number of interacting entities. These entities can
for instance be economic or social agents in social sciences
[1–3], atoms or molecules in statistical physics [4–6]. The
question of the emergence of macroscopic patterns from
the interactions of a large number of microscopic agents is
studied by both fields of science. In statistical physics, a
quantitative framework has been developed over the last
century, allowing the equilibrium behaviour of large as-
semblies of atoms or molecules to be handled precisely [6].
In socio-economic models, the preferences of individuals
are usually characterized by a utility function, which de-
scribes their welfare with respect to their current situation
or environment. Each individual or agent wants to max-
imize his own welfare. Decisions (e.g., moving to a more
convenient place) are thus taken in a purely selfish way,
while in physics the motion of particles is governed by the
variation of the total energy. Recently, a global function
linking individual decisions to the variation of a global
quantity has been introduced to describe some classes of
socio-economic models [7, 8]. This approach then allows
such models to be described with statistical physics tools.
Importantly, the equilibrium state can then be calculated
by maximizing a state function (akin to a free energy) in-
stead of having to solve a complicated Nash equilibrium
of strategically interacting agents.
The question we investigate in this letter is whether this
physical description of socio-economic models can be ex-
tended to other basic concepts of statistical physics, such
as the equalization of thermodynamic parameters like tem-
perature or chemical potential. The equalization of these
quantities throughout the system precisely results from
the conservation of the conjugated extensive quantities,
namely the energy or the number of particles. Although
there is no notion of energy in socio-economic models, the
dynamics indeed conserves the number of agents. A natu-
ral question is thus to know whether a chemical potential
can be defined in such models, and what would be its re-
lation to standard socio-economic concepts. This question
is further motivated by the following remark. In spatial
socio-economic models, the individual dynamics leads to
a Nash equilibrium, where no agent has an incentive to
move. If all agents are of the same type, the Nash equilib-
rium results in a spatially uniform utility, even if the en-
vironment is spatially inhomogeneous like in cities, where
the center plays a specific role. This uniformity property is
also expected from the chemical potential (if such a quan-
tity can be defined), suggesting a possible relation between
these two notions.
Here, we investigate this issue in the framework of a
generic class of exactly solvable models involving a popu-
lation of locally interacting agents. We define in a precise
way a chemical potential for this class of models, and pro-
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vide a direct link between the chemical potential and the
socio-economic utility. Two explicit examples from the
field of urban economics are also presented.
Model and dynamics. – This work deals with socio-
economic models characterized by a large number of in-
teracting agents, residing on a set of sites, labeled by an
index q = 1, . . . , Q. Agents are able to move from one
site to another in order to increase their utility. In ad-
dition, agents belong to m different groups, according for
instance to their income, or to their cultural preferences.
The variables used to describe the system are the numbers
nqi of agents of each group i = 1, . . . ,m at each node q.
The configuration of the system is described by the set
x = {nqi}. We assume that agents cannot change group,
so that for all i, the total number Ni =
∑
q nqi of agents
of group i is fixed. The satisfaction of agents of type i on
site q is characterized by a utility Uqi(nq1, ..., nqm) that
depends only on the numbers of agents of each group on
the same site q.
The model is defined with a continuous time dynamics
following a logit (or Glauber) rule, which is commonly
used in social sciences and in particular economic works
[9]. If transitions between sites q and q′ are allowed, agents
move from q to q′ with a probability per unit time
W =
ν0
1 + e−∆U/T
, (1)
where ∆U = U ′q′i−Uqi is the variation of the agent’s own
utility, with
U ′q′i = Uq′i(nq′1, ..., nq′i + 1, ..., nq′m) (2)
Uqi = Uqi(nq1, ..., nqi, ..., nqm). (3)
The parameter T plays the role of an effective tempera-
ture, introducing noise in the decision process to take into
account other factors influencing choices [9], and ν0 is a
characteristic transition frequency.
In order to obtain analytical results, we assume that the
utility function is such that the change of individual utility
experienced by an agent during a move can be expressed
as the variation of a function of the global configuration
x = {nqi} [7]. More precisely, we assume that there exists
a function L(x) such that for each agent in group i, moving
from node q to node q′,
U ′q′i − Uqi = L(y)− L(x) (4)
where y = (n11, . . . , nqi−1, . . . , nq′i+1, . . . , nQm) and x =
(n11, . . . , nQm) are the configurations of the system after
and before the move respectively. Such a function L(x)
thus provides a link between the individual behaviour of
agents and the evolution of the whole system. In physical
terms, it can be thought of as an effective energy. The
relevance of this assumption (which bears some similarities
with potential games [10]) for the general class of systems
considered above will be discussed at the end of the paper.
The stationary probability distribution Ps({nqi}) =
Ps(x) is obtained by solving the master equation governing
the dynamics of the system [11]. If Eq. (4) holds, detailed
balance is satisfied [11, 12], and we obtain the following
expression for the distribution Ps(x):
Ps(x) =
1
Zs
eL(x)/T∏
q,i nqi!
∏
i
δ
(∑
q
nqi −Ni
)
(5)
where Zs is a normalization constant. The product of
Kronecker δ functions accounts for the conservation of the
total number of agents in each group. The different fac-
tors appearing in Eq. (5) can be given a simple interpre-
tation. The exponential factor directly comes from the
detailed balance associated to the logit rule Eq. (1), while
the product of factorials appearing at the denominator in
Eq. (5) results from the coarse-graining of configurations.
Namely, given the numbers of agents {nqi}, there are for
each group Ni!/
∏
q nqi! ways to arrange the agents of the
group. As the numbersNi are fixed, Ni! can be reabsorbed
into the normalization constant.
Defining a density of agents ρqi = nqi/H , where H ≫ 1
is a characteristic number (for instance a maximal number
of agents on a site), the utility Uqi then becomes a func-
tion uqi(ρq1, ..., ρqm). We further assume that the function
L(x) can be written in the large deviation form [13]
L(x) = HL˜({ρqi}). (6)
To determine L˜, we combine Eqs. (4) and (6), and expand
L˜ to leading order in 1/H , yielding
∂L˜
∂ρq′i
−
∂L˜
∂ρqi
= uq′i − uqi. (7)
By identification, we get for all q
∂L˜
∂ρqi
= uqi(ρq1, ..., ρqm). (8)
As the r.h.s. of Eq. (8) only depends on densities of agents
on node q, L˜ necessarily takes the form
L˜({ρqi}) =
∑
q
lq(ρq1, ..., ρqm), (9)
and one has
∂lq
∂ρqi
= uqi. (10)
If there is a single group (m = 1), lq(ρq) is simply obtained
by integrating uq(ρq). In contrast, if m > 1, lq (and thus
L˜) only exists if the following condition, resulting from the
equality of cross-derivatives of lq, is satisfied:
∂uqi
∂ρqj
=
∂uqj
∂ρqi
, i 6= j. (11)
If this condition holds, the stationary distribution reads,
after an expansion of the factorials using Stirling’s for-
mula,
P({ρqi}) =
1
Z
∏
q
eHfq(ρq1,...,ρqm)/T
∏
i
δ
(∑
q
ρqi −Qρi
)
(12)
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where fq is given by
fq(ρq1, ..., ρqm) = lq(ρq1, ..., ρqm) + Ts(ρq1, ..., ρqm), (13)
with
s(ρq1, ..., ρqm) = −
∑
i
ρqi ln ρqi. (14)
In analogy to physical systems, fq(ρq1, ..., ρqm) can be in-
terpreted as a local free energy (up to a change of sign),
and the term s(ρq1, ..., ρqm), which is multiplied by the
’temperature’ T , may be seen as an entropic contribution
associated to the node q.
Utility and chemical potential. – We now turn to
the main result of this letter. The configurations {ρ∗qi}
which maximize F =
∑
q fq under the constraints of fixed
global density
∑
q ρqi = Qρi are the most probable (or
equilibrium) configurations. Finding the equilibrium den-
sities of agents is then a constrained maximization prob-
lem. Let us introduce a Lagrangian
L({ρqi}, {λi}) =
∑
q
fq(ρq1, ..., ρqm) (15)
−
∑
i
λi
(∑
q
ρqi −Qρi
)
,
where the parameters λi are Lagrange multipliers associ-
ated to the conservation of the number of agents in each
group. In physical terms, λi corresponds to the chemi-
cal potential1 of the agents of group i. The equilibrium
densities {ρ∗qi} are then determined from the conditions
∂L/∂ρqi = 0 for all (q, i), yielding
uqi(ρ
∗
q1, ..., ρ
∗
qm) + T
∂s
∂ρqi
(ρ∗q1, ..., ρ
∗
qm) = λi, (16)
which is the main result of this letter. Equation (16) thus
provides an answer to the question raised at the beginning
of this letter: there is indeed a direct relationship between
the socio-economic utility and the chemical potential de-
fined, in analogy to equilibrium physical systems, from
the conservation of the number of particles. At zero tem-
perature, both quantities can be identified. This result
might come as a surprise: utility is often thought to be
the socio-economic concept most similar to the physical
concept of energy (or more precisely, the opposite of the
energy), because agents seek to maximize their utility in
social systems and physical particles minimize the energy
in the zero temperature limit. Hence one might have in-
tuitively expected the homogeneity of utility to be linked
to a notion of temperature (the thermodynamic variable
conjugated to energy), rather than to a chemical potential.
1An equivalent formulation is to define the chemical potential
λi as the logarithmic derivative of the partition function Z with
respect to Ni, a definition that can be extended to some classes of
nonequilibrium models [14]. Note also that the standard definition of
chemical potential for equilibrium systems differs by a conventional
factor −1/T from the one we use here [6].
Interestingly, Eq. (16) not only provides a link between
two apparently unrelated concepts, but also yields a non-
trivial prediction on the variations of utility across the
system at non-zero temperature. As the chemical poten-
tial remains uniform at any temperature, one sees from
Eq. (16) that the utility uqi = λi − T∂s/∂ρqi becomes
non-uniform if T > 0, and that the corrections to unifor-
mity are given by the derivative of the local entropy.
In a statistical physics language, Eq. (12) corresponds
to the canonical ensemble, where the number of interact-
ing entities (agents or particles) is fixed. It is sometimes
convenient to consider the so-called grand-canonical en-
semble, where particles are exchanged with an external
reservoir. In the context of agent-based models, the reser-
voir corresponds to the external world. This means that
we implicitly consider a very large set of sites (’the world’)
and focus only on a small subpart of it (’the system’), still
containing a large number of agents. Since the ’world’
has a fixed number of agents, it can be described by the
stationary distribution Eq. (5). Following standard statis-
tical physics methods [6], the probability distribution of
the considered subpart is given by
Pow({ρqi}) =
1
Zow
∏
q
eH[fq(ρq1,...,ρqm)−
∑
i
λiρqi]/T , (17)
where λi is the chemical potential of group i imposed by
the external world. Finding the most probable densities
ρ∗qi is now straightforward since the densities on different
sites are independent. Maximizing the argument of the
exponential in Eq. (17), one recovers Eq. (16).
In the following, we give two examples of models be-
longing to the above generic class, in the context of urban
economics.
A simple urban economics model. – The model
presented here is a simple model of land use and transport
interaction in urban economics [15]. In this model, a city
is described as a grid composed of Q blocks. In each block,
one or several agents (representing households) can live by
paying a rent to the landowner. A central business district
(CBD) is placed on the grid and all agents commute there
for their work (monocentric city model). A transport cost
c per unit distance is associated to this commuting. The
distance between a block q and the CBD is denoted by rq.
The size of the city is fixed: a constant radius rf defines
the urban fringe, out of which no agent lives2. All agents
have the same income Y , which is spent on transport, on
housing and on a composite good z representing all other
consumer goods. This gives a budget constraint for each
agent
Y = z + crq + σpq (18)
2In standard urban economics models, land is used for agriculture
outside the city, and the landowners then earn an agricultural rent
[15]. These landowners rent to the highest bidder, so that all prices
must be greater than the agricultural rent. However, to simplify the
presentation, we have dropped the agricultural rent parameter by
introducing a fixed city size.
p-3
R. Lemoy et al.
where σ is the surface of housing, and pq is the rent per
unit surface in block q. We first consider a simple model
where all agents have the same surface of housing. Each
block of the grid is composed of H cells of surface σ0. A
configuration of the city is then given by the number of
agents nq in each block q. We make the further simplifying
assumption that the price pq of housing in a block q only
depends on the density ρq = nq/H of agents in this block,
namely pq = p(ρq). Let us emphasize that this hypothe-
sis is an important simplification with respect to standard
urban economics models, in which the price emerges di-
rectly from the competition for land between agents, and
the density from their utility maximization with respect
to the surface of housing [15]. In cases where an explicit
expression is required, we will use a logarithmic form
p(ρq) = p0 ln(1 + ρq), (19)
where p0 is a positive constant.
The utility function has to be specified explicitly. It
should be an increasing function U(z) of the quantity of
composite good z each agent consumes, that we choose
to be simply U(z) = z. This means that, in the limit
T → 0, each agent wants to maximize the share of his
income which is left after transport and housing expenses.
Using Eqs. (18) and (19), the utility U becomes a function
uq(ρq) of the local density,
uq(ρq) = Y − crq − σ0p(ρq). (20)
Urban economics distinguishes closed city models,
where the total number N of agents is fixed, and open
city models, where N fluctuates due to exchanges with
the external world [15]. We start by considering the closed
city model. In the continuous limit where H and N →∞
with the average density ρ = N/(HQ) fixed, the station-
ary probability distribution takes the form Eq. (12), with
fq(ρq) given by
fq(ρq) =
∫ ρq
0
uq(ρ)dρ+ Ts(ρq) (21)
and s(ρq) = −ρq ln ρq.
The most probable density ρ∗q is then obtained as a func-
tion of λ from Eq. (16), namely
uq(ρ
∗
q) + T
ds
dρq
(ρ∗q) = λ. (22)
In the limit T → 0, often considered in socio-economic
models, one finds ρ∗q = ρ
∗(rq , λ), with
ρ∗(rq, λ) = p
−1
(
Y − crq − λ
σ0
)
, (23)
where p−1 is the reciprocal function of p.
The parameter λ is then determined from the density
constraint
∑
q ρ
∗
q = Qρ. Following standard literature
[15], we focus here on the simplest situation of a one-
dimensional city. Using the continuous approximation
1
Q
∑
q
ρ∗q ≈
1
rf
∫ rf
0
ρ∗(r, λ) dr, (24)
we compute the average density ρ(λ), and then determine
numerically the reciprocal function λ(ρ).
We now briefly turn to the open city model (similar to
the above ’open world’ case) where agents can also move
to or from a large number of other cities. The stationary
distribution is given by Eq. (17), which in the present open
city model simplifies to
Poc({ρqi}) =
1
Zoc
∏
q
eH[fq(ρq)−λρq ]/T . (25)
Finding the most probable density is then an uncon-
strained maximization problem. The relation dfq/dρq = λ
yields the same equation as (22), resulting in the same den-
sity profile (23) in the limit T → 0. For T > 0, the density
can be obtained from a numerical resolution of Eq. (22).
We find that increasing the temperature T progressively
blurs the zero temperature profile given by Eq. (23), even-
tually leading to a homogeneous density. The same effect
has been observed in urban economics models [16]. As a
consequence, the city is more spread, leading to a utility
gain for agents near the city center, and to a loss for agents
in the periphery.
Urban model with two types of agents. – In
this second model, two income groups are distinguished.
Rich agents (group 1) have an income Y1 and a surface of
housing σ1, while poor agents (group 2) have an income
Y2 < Y1 and a surface of housing σ2 < σ1. Each block
contains at most H agents, irrespective of their group.
A configuration of the city is described by the densities
ρq1 = nq1/H and ρq2 = nq2/H in each block q. The price
Pqi an agent of group i pays for housing in block q depends
on his surface of housing and on the local density of poor
and rich agents:
Pq1(ρq1, ρq2) = σ1 p˜(a1ρq1 + b1ρq2)
Pq2(ρq1, ρq2) = σ2 p˜(a2ρq1 + b2ρq2)
(26)
where a1, b1, a2 and b2 are given constants, and p˜ a func-
tion to be determined. The utility function of an agent of
group i = 1, 2 in block q has the form
uqi(ρq1, ρq2) = Yi − crq − Pqi(ρq1, ρq2). (27)
The model is analytically solvable if Eq. (11) is satisfied.
For this condition to hold, one can choose a1 = a2 and
b1 = b2. Then if σ1b1 = σ2a2, the function p˜ can take any
form, for instance the logarithmic form Eq. (19) used in
the previous model, in which case we get (choosing b1 = σ2
and a2 = σ1)
Pqi(ρq1, ρq2) = σi p0 ln(1 + σ1ρq1 + σ2ρq2). (28)
p-4
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Fig. 1: Density profile ρ∗qi as a function of rq for both groups of
agents (rich, full line; poor, dashed line) for different temper-
atures: T/T ′0 = 0.0018 (a), 0.018 (b), 0.089 (c) and 0.36 (d),
with T ′0 ≡ p0σ2. The dotted lines indicate the total density
ρ∗q1 + ρ
∗
q2. Parameters: p0 = 1.4, c = 0.4, Y1 = 452, Y2 = 301,
σ1 = 6, σ2 = 4, rf = 30, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.13.
The stationary distribution is given by Eq. (12), with
fq(ρq1, ρq2) = lq(ρq1, ρq2) + Ts(ρq1, ρq2). (29)
The expression of s(ρq1, ρq2) is given by Eq. (14), with
m = 2. Expressing lq(ρq1, ρq2) explicitly, we get
lq(ρq1, ρq2) =
∫ ρq1
0
uq1(ρ, 0) dρ+
∫ ρq2
0
uq2(ρq1, ρ) dρ.
(30)
The validity of Eq. (10), as well as the symmetry of
Eq. (30) with respect to ρq1 and ρq2, can be checked using
Eq. (11). The equilibrium densities (ρ∗q1, ρ
∗
q2) are deter-
mined from Eq. (16), yielding a system of two non-linear
equations, to be solved numerically. The results of this
numerical resolution are shown on Fig. 1. One recovers at
low temperature the standard separation, typical of north-
american cities, between poor agents in the city center,
and rich agents in the periphery [15]. The effect of a tem-
perature increase is mainly to blur the zero temperature
pattern, hence avoiding total segregation.
Therefore, Eq. (16) provides a direct prediction for the
utility profile at arbitrary temperature T . It would be in-
teresting to know whether this result remains valid beyond
its a priori domain of validity, namely for models satisfying
Eq. (11) so that a function L˜ can be defined. Considering
again the above urban model with two types of agents, we
keep the logarithmic form Eq. (19) for p˜, and choose as an
example a1 = a2 = 1 and b1 = b2 = 0. These values imply
σ1b1 6= σ2a2 so that Eq. (11) is not satisfied, ruling out
the possibility to find a potential function L˜ and to get a
simple analytical solution of the model.
Performing numerical simulations of this agent-based
model with two income groups, in the case of a one-
dimensional closed city, we first validate the simulation
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
rq / rf
320
360
400
440
u
q,
 i 
,
 
λ i
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
rq / rf
160
200
240
280
Fig. 2: Agent-based simulations of the model with two types
of agents (left: i = 1; right: i = 2), when no potential func-
tion L˜ exists (one-dimensional closed city). The utility uqi is
plotted as a function of rq for two temperatures (T = 100, ∗;
T = 20, ×). Adding to the utility the term T∂s/∂ρqi yields
the chemical potential λi (T = 100, ♦; T = 20, ), found to be
constant throughout the system although the analytical solu-
tion is not known. Full lines are horizontal lines indicating the
spatially averaged value of the chemical potential. Parameters:
p0 = 70, c = 2, Y1 = 480, Y2 = 300, σ1 = 6.4, σ2 = 4, rf = 50,
N1 = N2 = 2000, H = 200, Q = 51.
thanks to a comparison with the above solvable case.
Turning to the non-solvable case, we test the validity of
Eq. (16), that is, whether the chemical potentials λi =
uqi + T∂s/∂ρqi (i = 1, 2) are uniform over the city for
T > 0 (when T → 0, the utility should be uniform any-
how). We indeed observe that for a non-zero temperature,
the chemical potentials are homogeneous even in this non-
solvable model, while the utility is not (see Fig. 2). We
also note that although the number of agents is relatively
small (H = 200), no systematic space-dependent correc-
tion to the chemical potential is observed.
We further use the obtained values of λ1 and λ2 to per-
form a numerical resolution of the system of non-linear
equations (16), which we assume to be valid even in the
absence of a potential L function. Interestingly, the results
of the agent-based model and of the numerical resolution
are found to be in very good agreement (see Fig. 3), thus
yielding a complementary test of the validity of the chem-
ical potential approach.
The validity of Eq. (16) in this case can be understood
as follows. In this paper, we focused on cases when the
probability distribution has the factorized form Eq. (12),
which is a consequence of the existence of a potential func-
tion L˜. When no function L˜ exists, the stationary distri-
bution is no longer factorized, and we do not know its
functional form. However, if the stationary distribution
has only short range correlations, a chemical potential can
still be introduced, in the same way as a chemical poten-
tial can be defined in a physical system with short-range
interactions [6].
This result is also consistent with a phenomenon known
in the nonequilibrium statistical physics literature as
p-5
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
rq / rf
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
ρ q
, i
Fig. 3: Comparison of the density profiles obtained by agent-
based simulations (i = 1, ×; i = 2, ⋄) and by numerical inte-
gration (i = 1, full line; i = 2, dashed line) using the values of
λ1 and λ2 measured in the agent-based model (see text). Same
parameters as in Fig. 2 with T = 20.
“restoration of detailed balance” [17, 18]. Namely, start-
ing from a microscopic stochastic dynamics which does
not obey detailed balance, a coarse-graining procedure
can lead to a detailed balance relation in terms of the
effective, coarse-grained, degrees of freedom. This phe-
nomenon can appear in physical systems in cases where no
macroscopic flux is present (like fluxes of energy or parti-
cles between boundary reservoirs), as macroscopic fluxes
cannot be smeared out by the coarse-graining procedure.
In the socio-economic models we consider in this paper,
there is no obvious macroscopic flux, which suggest that
detailed balance may be restored on large scales.
Discussion. – In this letter, we have provided a
clear relationship between the apparently unrelated no-
tions of socio-economic utility and chemical potential.
More specifically, we have shown that the uniformity of
utility across the social system can be traced back to the
conservation of the number of agents. This result not only
provides a conceptually interesting link, but also yields
non-trivial and testable predictions on the variations of
utility among choices (e.g., sites, blocks) when T > 0. We
also found numerical evidence that our result extends be-
yond the class of models in which it was initially derived.
It would thus be interesting to explore further its validity
through numerical simulations of more realistic models.
The idea of a non-uniform utility at equilibrium (Fig. 2)
may be counter-intuitive for economists. Indeed, Nash
equilibrium for homogeneous agents implies that all have
the same utility, which seems not to be the case here when
T > 0, since agents in the border of the city have a lower
utility than those at the center. However, when noise is
introduced in the decision process, a static equilibrium
picture is no longer valid. Noise allows agents to explore
the city, so that the time average value of utility is the
same for all agents, leading to a macrostate described by
Eq. (16) through the ergodic hypothesis linking time and
ensemble averages. The average utility of agents is then
a decreasing function of T . Note that this picture of a
“time-averaged agent” is close in spirit to the notion of
“representative agent” advocated in discrete choice the-
ory [9]. It would be interesting to investigate further the
relation between these two approaches.
Another interpretation of our result is to consider the
chemical potential λi as an effective utility. We first note
that the distribution P({ρqi}) at T > 0 can be obtained
from the zero-temperature distribution by replacing lq by
fq = lq + Ts [see Eqs. (12) and (13)], in the same way
as the macroscopic energy is replaced by the free en-
ergy in a physical system at finite temperature. Then,
changing lq into fq in Eq. (10), we get an effective utility
ueffqi = ∂fq/∂ρqi. Hence the Nash equilibrium of an assem-
bly of fictitious agents having this utility would precisely
correspond to Eq. (16), namely ueffqi = λi.
∗ ∗ ∗
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